Introduction
In recent years, the character education agenda has shaped education policy on both sides of the Atlantic in important ways. In the United Kingdom, the Department for Education has begun to encourage schools to promote virtues like perseverance, confidence, motivation, drive, neighbourliness, tolerance, honesty, and conscientiousness amongst children. 1 In the United States, character education programmes are regularly touted as the solution to the country's democratic crisis and behavioural problems in the country's schools. 2 A variety of interventions have begun to be used there, including programmes to promote 'grit' and 'resilience' modelled on training provided by the US Army. 3 A number of well-known objections to character education exist in the literature, for instance: that it focuses on the wrong virtues, that it does not work and that it is the business of parents, not schools. 4 Of all the objections to character education programmes in school, one class of objection stands out. This is the political objection by, for instance, Kohn, that character education is 'tantamount to indoctrination' and represents schools meddling with the values that children (or their families) should decide for themselves. 5 Why is character education politically controversial? A natural answer can be found in the liberal idea that the state should not promote any one particular ideal of the good life, but should let citizens choose their own 'comprehensive conception' of how to live. However, within the broadly liberal camp dispute remains about how exactly to think about schools' efforts to shape the character of the children who go there. According to liberal neutralists, schools should not promote any particular conception of the good amongst children, but should be neutral with regard to the values orientation it promotes amongst children. According to liberal perfectionists, however, promoting liberalism is itself to promote a particular comprehensive conception amongst children. Rather than barring schools from shaping the child's character, liberal perfectionists wish to circumscribe the values that schools can inculcate and limit these to the ones necessary to promote a liberal order.
In this article I discuss liberal approaches to character education as it plays out in debates between liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists. 6 For liberals of both stripes, the essential puzzle about education is how we can justify making education compulsory for children who do not freely choose to be educated. I hold that both liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists struggle with this problem in different ways. The problem, as I see it, is that both liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists do not distinguish carefully enough between shaping children's moral and intellectual character and, as an alternative to both liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism, I provide a defence of a different weak perfectionist position regarding education: 'intellectual perfectionism'. According to 'intellectual perfectionism' the task of the liberal school is to develop the child's intellectual, rather than their moral character. I hold that intellectual perfectionism captures much that advocates of liberal neutralism and liberal perfectionism will find attractive; I also hold that intellectual perfectionism captures best the unique role of the school.
Liberal Neutrality about Education
According to the principle of liberal neutrality about the good, as we find it in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, the state should be neutral with respect to the kinds of life that its citizens lead. 7 According to Rawls, the role of the state is not to promote living a certain kind of lifeeven a good life. Rather, the role of the state is to secure all citizens as much freedom as possible to form their own comprehensive conception of the good life and pursue it. Rawls holds that if it is to regulate the public realm to promote both justice and individual freedom, the state must be neutral regarding individuals' own private life projects: it must not promote any conceptions of the good beyond that necessary to keep public life 'well-ordered'. 8 Those like Clayton who apply the liberal neutrality principle to thinking about education hold that the same stricture applies to the school: the school should only promote values and orientations that are strictly necessary to uphold the liberal order and should be neutral about all further comprehensive questions. Clayton situates the matter in the context of perfectionist and anti-perfectionist approaches to upbringing. According to perfectionists, it is morally permissible for those who play a role in bringing up children (such as parents or teachers) to shape children's view about what the good life is and to help them live such a life. 9 For anti-perfectionists, 10 it is not allowable to shape children's comprehensive conception of the good life in this way.
Clayton's anti-perfectionism brings him into immediate conflict with the character education movement. The dominant conception of character education as it has taken shape in the UK, the USA and further afield is as a form of education that attempts to shape children's moral character in such a way that they can flourish as individuals. A number of educational philosophers, including De Ruyter, Brighouse, White, Curren and Kristj ansson, explicitly defend flourishing as the aim of education. 11 According to these views, the fundamental purpose of the school is indeed to 'perfect' children's skills, capabilities, moral outlook or whole lives in such a way that they can live the best life possible. Now, moral character is almost paradigmatic of what Rawls thinks belongs to a person's private life (as opposed to their public life). He writes that the private includes:
. . . conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships . . . 12 
(emphasis mine)
The main reason Clayton holds the state should refrain from trying to promote citizens' wellbeing through education is that individuals should not be coerced by their schools or teachers into making personal choices about how to live their lives. Rather, they should make these choices independently. Clayton writes at length about the nature of independence or autonomy, but, in the end, supports a simple and compelling view:
. . . a person's independence is violated when others determine the ends she pursues or serves, period. 13 A clear problem for Clayton's view is that children do not tend to make autonomous choices about their own schooling; when young, they are simply not in the position autonomously to choose how they are schooled. Clayton concedes that not all children are in a position to make judgements of their own about their education. However, children mature to adulthood and can, once they have become adults, retrospectively give consent to the education they have received. Clayton repeatedly stresses the importance of informed consent to independence. 14 He draws a parallel between children who are too young to give consent to being taught anything and people who are temporarily unable to give consent to some kind of medical treatment. He cites the following example in support.
Fertility Fix: Amy is rendered unconscious by an accident and is undergoing surgery to save her life. In the course of the operation the surgeon discovers that Amy is infertile and fixes that as well. 15 As Clayton points out, waking up from the surgery, Amy is not likely retrospectively to reject that the surgeons saved her life; however, she may very well reject the fertility fix. Clayton thinks the same is the case with children and the education they receive. If the school teaches a certain comprehensive conception of the goodsay, a certain religious teaching about the meaning of lifeit is possible that, in future, the child may reject that teaching, making this religious teaching a violation of their autonomy. However, if the school teaches children something that they are never likely to rejectlike, say, being able to read or writethis is no violation of their autonomy. Clayton in effect proposes a future rejection standard for what is permissible to teach at school: if a piece of curricular content is liable to be rejected when the child reaches adulthood, it is not permissible for schools to teach it. Unfortunately for Clayton, such a standard does not work well for deciding the permissibility of teaching children certain things at school. In one sense, the standard is far too strict for real life application. To see this, note that thousands of adults in actual fact reject large swathes of what they had been taught at schoolthink of the many people who complain that what they were taught in history class at school was misleading, or what they were taught in algebra is irrelevant. If possible future rejection made something impermissible to teach, precious little curricular content would remain allowable to teach. In another sense, the standard is too weak to draw the kind of distinctions that Clayton wants to draw. Take the case of being taught a certain set of values in school. No-one is likely retrospectively to complain that the school turned them into someone who is honest, or kind, brave, fair, or humble. The point is that if one is genuinely kind, brave, fair or humble, one also values being kind, brave, fair or humble. It follows that learning to become genuinely kind, brave, fair or humble rules out that one will ever reject what one learned. In the end, it seems that, if the school only does its job of moral education well enough and it teaches children both what values to hold and also manages to convince them that these values are good to the extent that they will not reject them as adults, then perfectionist moral character education would be allowable by Clayton's standard. In short, we cannot fix liberal neutralism's problem of gaining children's consent to their education by relying on children's future consent to their education, because that very education will itself shape the likelihood whether they give their consent to their education in future or not.
Liberal Perfectionism about Education
Against Clayton's anti-perfectionist neutralism about education stands the perfectionist position called 'liberal perfectionism'. Liberal perfectionists like Gutmann and Levinson hold that it is not a brute fact that children are autonomous and that their autonomy should (therefore) be respected. 16 Rather, autonomy is itself a good that should be nurtured and developed through education. Against liberal neutralists, who hold that the state should not support the development of any particular conception of the good life amongst citizens, liberal perfectionists hold that to be fully autonomous is itself to have a 'comprehensive conception' because it involves valuing one's own and others' autonomy. 17 Levinson argues that, even on Rawls's own picture, autonomy is not a neutral characteristic of people, but is a gooda virtuethat should be developed. 18 As we saw above, Rawls stresses that under conditions of freedom, people will inevitably come to hold very different views regarding what the good life is. This is the problem of pluralism and, in a world characterised by pluralism, people will have to engage in a form of civic compromise in which they (1) accept that others will differ in their views of the good life (2) understand others' views and (3) attempt to negotiate and compromise with other people regarding how to live, while (4) knowing full well that the issue of how best to live is hard to settle. Rawls calls this quandary the 'burdens of judgement'. 19 Now, it is clearly not good enough for the burdens of judgement to exist in the abstract; for them to have an influence over people's actions, people must take on board dealing with these burdens as a personal commitment. If one accepts the burdens of judgement, one is already committed to valuing one's own and others' autonomy.
Levinson observes that protecting and promoting the liberal order requires of the state to develop autonomy (as a good) amongst future citizenschildren. 20 The most natural site at which the state can develop autonomy is the school. As Levinson acknowledges, however, schooling children for autonomy poses a particular problem of justification. Schooling is compulsory, and children do not choose for the development of their autonomy. The 'puzzle of autonomy', as Levinson puts it, is that in order to develop children's autonomy, society must first take autonomy away by forcing children to attend school and there to submit to an education they do not particularly want. 21 The neutralist response to the problem of autonomy, of course, is to prohibit the undue shaping of children's comprehensive conceptions by the school; the neutralist justification for this is that children have not chosen those comprehensive conceptions themselves. Levinson is doubtful about this neutralist 'protection' strategy, however. She holds that protections against state perfectionism are typically designed to weaken the hands of teachers and schools in forcing their conceptions of the good on children; however, the less power teachers and schools have to influence children's conceptions of the good, the more power children's parents have to impose their particular conceptions of the good on children. 22 Because it seems that someone will influence children's comprehensive conception no matter what we do, Levinson argues that schools should have the liberal perfectionist power to develop children's autonomy as a counterweight to the (less liberal) perfectionist projects of children's parents.
Levinson suggests that, to be autonomous, one must first be a person with a set of one's own priorities, values and commitments (she mentions emotional, intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic commitments). In addition, one must also have the faculties to reflect on these commitments: she specifically mentions critical thinking skills and selfknowledge as foundational to such reflection. Finally, she identifies autonomy as:
. . . the process of reflecting upon our beliefs and desires, attempting to resolve such incoherences as are troubling, and revising our preferences in light of self-critical reflection that makes one's beliefs and desires our ownthat permits us to claim that we truly are self-legislating. 23 While Levinson holds that autonomy is valuable, it is important to note that she actually has a fairly weak account of how far autonomy should be promoted. She holds that, while the task of the school is to make autonomous choice possible for everyone, there is no demand that everyone must become highly individual or heterodox in their world viewit must only be the case that they are able to reflect on and adjust their world view should they wish. In a passage that will appeal to Clayton too, she writes:
In promoting the development of autonomy, the state is not claiming that the autonomous way of life is the only legitimate way of life, or that autonomy is a prerequisite for citizenship. It is simply trying to right the balance of power by giving individuals the ability in their adult lives to do what they could not do as childrenspecifically, to determine their own values and to adopt a conception of the good with which they identify (as opposed to those with which they happened as children to be identified). 24 
From Autonomy to Rational Thinking
In the end Clayton and Levinson differ over neutralism and perfectionism; however, there is a marked similarity in how they see the role of education. The main difference between Clayton and Levinson's position seems to be whether we call the capacity to make this kind of choice 'valuable' or 'good' and are happy to see schools as self-consciously nurturing and promoting it (Levinson) or whether one sees it as an ability or capacity that people have as a matter of right and that other people (including parents and teachers) should accept and respect (Clayton) . For both Levinson and Clayton, the point of education is that the child should become able, 25 after they have received an education, to reflect on the education they had and the world-view that that education has left them with. If the child approves (after having received their particular form of education) of that educational experience, temporarily over-ruling their autonomy by making them undergo it would have been justified; if not, not.
Above we already noted the problem that the backwards-looking approach to justifying schooling creates for Clayton. Recall Clayton's future rejection standard: if one coerces children both into adopting some kind of comprehensive conception and one manipulates their feelings about it, it is possible to coerce children to adopt a set of values that they will not reject in future. The same problem rears its head for Levinson in a slightly different guise: this is that what might seem like autonomy to the child later in their life may simply be their unimaginatively endorsing the values that were forced on them as children.
Levinson worries about parents' perfectionist projects and proposes that teachers' perfectionism can work to cancel out parents' jaundiced projects. She has in mind examples (like the decision in Mozert v Hawkins) where the courts have compelled parents from a religiously conservative group to keep their children in a public education programme. 26 Levinson thinks that, where parents from closed religious communities are not likely to enhance children's autonomy, the American public school should step in to do it. The problem for Levinson is that school perfectionism only ameliorates parental perfectionism when the school has a demonstrably better comprehensive agenda than children's parents do. This may have been so for the Mozert parents, but it is not always the case. Sometimes, school and parents do not have different perfectionist agendas, but the same perfectionist agenda. When this is the case, school perfectionism will reinforce parental perfectionism rather than cancel it out. Moreover, even where school and parents do have completely different perfectionist agendas, who is to say that the school's perfectionist agenda is necessarily better than that of the parents? Imagine the child from some Luddite community in rural America, whose parents attempt to enlist the child into their unsophisticated but peaceable way of life. Imagine that, in the name of autonomy, the courts force the child to go to public school in the nearby town where the teachers try to enlist them in (say) the projects of originalism, exceptionalism and blind loyalty to the flag. Even though that school may have a different perfectionist project from the child's parents, the courts may simply send the child from the frying pan to the fire.
Levinson's answer is that the task of the school is to teach the children a plural curriculum, that is for the school to teach sufficiently many varied options regarding how to live, and also to teach the children the imagination and thinking skills to be able to discern accurately whether their education (at home or at school) was any good. But this is exactly the point, for the difference is not made by the school teaching (1) many plural views or indeed (2) views that are different from their parents' views, or even, (3) reflection as such. The difference is made by the quality of the views taughtwhether they are sensible or notand by the quality of the reflective thinking abilities that the school fosters.
To illustrate the indispensable role that the rational content and quality of what is taught plays in deciding whether a form of education is justified or not, Fowler distinguishes between three cases in which the state must pick sides over what a child is to be taught by their parents or by their school:
(1) A case where education involves outright abuse of a childsay, a parent or teacher employs corporal punishment as part of their teaching strategy. (2) A case where a parent or teacher teaches something that is seemingly politically reasonable, but that results in real harm to a child -Fowler mentions the case of the 'fruitarian' parents whose nutritional strategy resulted in their baby dying of malnutrition in 2001. (3) A case in which a child is not harmed in the physical sense, but is nonetheless taught something objectionable -Fowler gives the example of a school that teaches children that homosexuals will go to hell. 27 While most liberals would be comfortable outlawing the teaching of (1) and perhaps also the upbringing envisaged under (2), the situation becomes more difficult in case (3) . If the school not only teaches that homosexuals will go to hell, but also advocates violence against homosexuals, this view is clearly not politically reasonable and Rawls would reject it; but what if the school teaches no earthly discrimination against homosexuals whatsoever, but merely teaches that, at the day of final judgement it is a sad fact that the homosexuals will go to hell? 28 Would the Rawlsian liberal be comfortable outlawing teaching (3)? Fowler holds that, because such a view does not necessarily clash with purely political reasonableness, the Rawlsian would have no ground to outlaw teaching this; yet, as Fowler points out, teaching something like this might very well harm a child: take the doubt, guilt and shame engendered in the child who feels same-sex attraction but is told that they will burn for it. In short, more than just being politically reasonable, what is taught in school must pass a test of rationality. Adapting Fowler's example a little to our case, it will make no difference if the school and parents each simply teach something different about homosexuality. School and parents can teach different things that are both wrong. Neither does the school teaching a plurality of things make a difference as such; the school can teach a whole menu of things about homosexuality that are all wrong. The school may even teach both the right and the wrong thing about homosexuality as part of a plural menu of views, but may not help the child see which is the right view. The point is that what form of education will truly enhance a child's freedom, and which not, can only be judged by paying attention to whether what is taught is rational or epistemically justified. 29 Mere difference or plurality is not good enough.
What we want from a school education, in a phrase, is to teach children how to think and reason about the world, that is, how to be rational. We do not simply seek their own later buy-in to what they were taught (Clayton) and neither do we simply demand that children are taught a plurality of views (Levinson) . The liberal position about justifying education actually relies on promoting children's abilities to think rationally. What is needed in the liberal framework is not only a political discussion about how the state should regulate education, but an epistemological discussion about the nature of the good thinking processes that should be promoted through education.
The Intellectual Virtue Alternative
The problem that began this article is: what attitude should liberals take to character education? Liberals from the neutralist and the perfectionist camps are sceptical about the project of strong perfectionists who think that schools must shape children's character and world-view comprehensively. Instead, they suggest proscribing perfectionism completely (Clayton) or limiting perfectionism to the fostering of autonomy (Levinson). But strongly perfectionist moral character education is not the only kind of character education that schools can provide. reminds us that, in Aristotle's theory of the virtues, there are two large classes of virtuethe moral and the intellectual virtues. In fact, Baehr advocates intellectual character education exactly on the basis that it is more politically acceptable than moral character education. He writes:
. . . 'intellectual character education' as we might call it, sidesteps one of the main objections raised against more traditional approaches to character education. Some object to these approaches on the grounds that they rely on controversial notions of morality that are out of place in public education. This objection has little force against the attempt to educate for intellectual virtues. . . [I]ntellectual virtues are the character traits required for good thinking and learning. They presuppose no controversial moral commitments. 30 At this juncture, it is useful to remind ourselves of how Aristotle describes the nature of virtue and its cultivation. Aristotle distinguishes between the moral and the intellectual virtues at the beginning of Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, the two forms of virtue belong to different parts of the soulthe moral virtues belong to the 'desiring' and the intellectual virtues to the 'rational' part of the soul. 31 While not always discussed in the same depth as Aristotle's moral virtues, it is clear that Aristotle had a very intellectual picture of virtue and the good life. For instance, towards the end of Book VI, Aristotle makes it clear that it is the intellectual virtue of phronesis that brings moral virtue to full virtue; and in Book X he goes further to hold that philosophic wisdom (sophia) is the highest form of wisdom (higher even than phronesis). 32 More than just being different, Aristotle holds that intellectual and moral virtue are acquired in different ways. He writes:
. . . intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching . . . while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit. . . 33 Aristotle clearly thought that intellectual virtue was the kind of thing that one can teach, but he had his doubts about the direct teachability of moral virtue, holding that the moral virtues are learned by example and practice. That this was Aristotle's view of the school is given some practical backing by his own approach to education. It is well known that the Nicomachean Ethics was adapted from his lectures on ethics given at the Lyceum. Aristotle intended the NE to be studied by (and his Lyceum to be attended by) morally relatively well-developed students who had already absorbed the moral virtues (most likely from their home environment). Rather than teaching them moral virtue at the Lyceum, Aristotle thought he could only teach children who had already acquired the moral virtues how to think about virtue theoretically. As Hughes puts it, Aristotle thought that his own role as teacher was only to:
. . . provide the final stage of a process of moral education . . . to give the theoretical backing to a process of moral training which had already been largely completed. 34 In sum, no one less than Aristotle asserts that only the intellectual and not the moral virtues can truly be taught. Moreover, circumstantially it seems that his attitude to his own teaching practice was rather more intellectually perfecting than truly 'morally enlisting'. The prospects for a retrieval of Aristotle's position begin to look enticing. Should we not say, in parallel with this understanding of Aristotle, that school is for the development of children's intellectual virtues rather than for the development of their moral virtues?
What is Intellectual Character Education?
Recently, a number of philosophers working in the virtue-epistemology tradition have suggested that the aim of education is the development of the intellectual virtues amongst children. 35 The intellectual virtues are those features of a person's cognitive character that characterise her as a thinker; examples of intellectual virtues are curiosity, open-mindedness, accuracy, rigour, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. In the virtue epistemology tradition, there are two ways of thinking about the nature of a person's cognitive character. According to the 'reliabilist' tradition associated with, for instance Sosa and Greco the intellectual virtues are best understand as reliable cognitive faculties like, good sight, good hearing, accurate memory, etc. 36 On the other hand, 'responsibilist' virtue epistemologists, like for instance Montmarquet and Zagzebski, see the intellectual virtues more like intellectual character traits, that is, one's 'good habits' in thinking. 37 Just like patience, gratitude, kindness and so on are good moral character traits, so being curious, open-minded, accurate, exacting, honest, etc. are good intellectual character traits. Importantly, proponents of the intellectual virtue approach in education hold that we should develop the second kind of intellectual virtue. This is because the reliabilist virtues (such as how well one sees or hears) are to a large extent 'natural' or inborn and not amenable to much improvement, whereas the responsibilist virtues are exactly the kind of thing that can be improved through education and that one can probably only acquire through a process of learning. For this reason, I also focus on the responsibilist virtues.
Baehr gives the following definition of intellectual virtue:
Intellectual Virtue: for any intellectual virtue V, a subject S possesses V only if S is: (a) disposed to manifest a certain activity or psychology characteristic of V (b) out of a love of epistemic goods. 38 On this model, an individual is open-minded (say) only if she is disposed to manifest the good habits of thinking involved in open-mindedness (say, considering alternative viewpoints thoroughly and without prejudice) out of a love for epistemic goods (say, out of a love of exploring matters deeply and arriving at the right conclusion).
Integrating these points, then, the intellectual virtue approach to education is that it is the task of education to (1) teach children to be intellectually virtuousthat is to have certain good habits of thinking out of (2) a love of epistemic goods (like truth, knowledge and understanding).
While this approach is by now well known, so far no-one has situated this proposal that schools should focus on the inculcation of the intellectual virtues in this political terrain of deciding whether schools should or should not be allowed to teach children a comprehensive conception and exactly what that conception should be. We can now state the proposed position in full. Clayton holds that, on liberal grounds, teachers should not shape children's comprehensive views at all. On different liberal grounds, Levinson holds that schools can only shape children's autonomy (nothing else). Adapting an old and respectable view -Aristotle's view that there is a difference between the intellectual and the moral virtues and that we should think differently about how to inculcate these different forms of virtue -I propose a different answer.
Intellectual perfectionism: The aim of schooling is to pursue one and only one perfectionist project and that is fostering intellectual virtue among the children who go there.
The view is that we should be perfectionists about children's intellects, but neutralists about their morals.
The proposal on the table is an alternative, weak form of perfectionism that should hold intuitive appeal both for liberal neutrals and for liberal perfectionists. Because such an approach explicitly cuts out state interference in children's conception of how they should live their life in the moral, political or religious sense, it may assuage neutralists' worries about coercion. And, because of the clear link between being able to think for oneself and individual autonomy, it may also appeal to liberal perfectionists like Levinson (and Gutmann) on the basis that being able to think well and independently will promote what they value (i.e. children's autonomy). Let us consider the prospects for an 'intellectual perfectionism about education' in more depth.
Liberalism and Intellectual Character Education
As we saw, the dispute between liberal neutralists and liberal perfectionists hinge on how we should see autonomy: as an essentially value-neutral capacity that should be respected or as a gooda virtuethat should be developed and promoted. Cognisant of the danger that perfectionism might balloon out of control and become illiberal, 'liberal' or 'weak' perfectionists propose various restrictions on perfectionism. Thus, according to Fowler's 'restricted perfectionism' we should limit the state's perfectionist projects to children: he proposes 'perfectionism for children and anti-perfectionism for adults. 39 And as we saw, Levinson holds that we should draw a distinction between the perfectionist projects that parents may pursue and the perfectionist projects that schools may pursue, because the one may balance out the other. Taking the conjunction of these points, let us focus, then, on the most limited matter: the perfectionist projects that schools, in particular, are or are not allowed to engage in with regard to children.
As I hold elsewhere, the essential task of the school is to ensure the reproduction and advancement of human knowledge. Briefly put, my argument is that the characteristic role of the school is to make sure that each new generation of people takes on board: (a) the sum of human knowledge, (b) the means to improve that body of knowledge and (c) the means to pass it on. 40 If each generation does not do this, human knowledge will be lost. With human knowledge having achieved a great degree of sophistication and specialisation, this task can no longer be achieved by parents or society informally; a dedicated epistemic institution like the school is needed to pass on this knowledge. Furthermore, while there are many other things that children need from society besides being inducted into human knowledge, there are other institutions that can carry on these important societal functions concerning the upbringing of children: families can house, clothe and feed children, the medical profession can keep them healthy, the police can protect them, clubs and societies can enculturate them, etc. The point is that the shaping of the intellect happens best in school and what the school can do best (from amongst all its possible social roles) is shape the intellect. This is why I focus, in my account, on the school as an institution concerned first and foremost with shaping children's intellects.
Note that, in carrying out this task, we must distinguish between the task of the school to pass on a specific body of human knowledge (such as knowledge of certain scientific truths, knowledge of certain pieces of literature, knowledge of certain episodes in history, etc.) and its task in building children's capacity for good thinking, that is shaping their epistemic character. Following Dewey, I hold that the second is as important as the first because human knowledge is not staticit changes (hopefully growing) over time. 41 To the survival of human knowledge it is essential that each new generation of knowers not only learns the most important pieces of knowledge already discovered, but also acquires productive habits of thinking that will allow them to correct and improve our stock of human knowledge. In this it is essential that members of the new generation not only take knowledge on board, but also begin to love knowledge. For one thing, without a love of knowledge one will not be particularly meticulous in correcting and improving our stock of knowledge; for another, without a love of knowledge, one will not be inclined to pass it on carefully to the next generation. The intellectual project of education is enlisting children (often against their immediate inclination) into our intellectual culture and bringing them to love it so that they will keep it alive, seek to correct and improve it and seek to pass it on. If this is to be successful, young people need to learn not only specific bodies of theoretical or practical knowledge, they need to become intellectually virtuous. As a comprehensive ideal, I hold that teaching intellectual virtue is epistemically justified by the role that it plays in the continuous social reproduction of knowledge.
In my other work, I offer an epistemic justification for teaching the intellectual virtues. Here, though, I wish to argue that intellectual perfectionism is also politically justified. The argument is that political liberalism (in both its neutralist and perfectionist forms) actually demands the teaching of intellectual virtues because the intellectual virtues enhance the kinds of autonomy that liberals would like to promote. To see this, note the following two arguments (6.1 and 6.2).
Autonomy and Intellectual Character
As we have seen, Clayton acknowledges the view that autonomy is a precondition for making free choices about the kind of life one is to lead. Indeed, he stresses that independence requires a capacity for a conception of the good, in Rawls's sense. This he calls the capacity to 'deliberate rationally' about one's ends . . . and the 'intellectual and physical wherewithal to pursue the ends that they come to endorse'. 42 A natural question to ask at this juncture is what the capacity for critical and rational reflection is exactly, and how a person comes to have such a capacity. Clayton sees autonomy as being able to form a conception of the good life for oneself in a rational manner; he identifies these capacities with children having '. . . the right kind of intellectual powers critically to reflect upon their ethical lives . . .'. 43 Likewise, in her picture of autonomy, Levinson stresses that an important feature of an autonomous person is their ability to 'make and act upon rational decisions' and she holds that the traditionally recognised conditions for autonomy include critical thinking skills and self-knowledge. Most importantly, Levinson holds that the autonomous person can challenge and reflect upon their first order desires. 44 Summing up her view on autonomy, Levinson writes that:
. . . the ideal of personal autonomy is a substantive notion of higher-order preference formation within a context of cultural coherence, plural constitutive personal values and beliefs, openness to others' evaluations of oneself, and a sufficiently developed moral, spiritual or aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional personality. 45 Clearly, this 'higher-order preference formation' is engaging in a sophisticated kind of thinking. While they do not foreground it, both Clayton and Levinson lean on an idea of personal freedom as having developed intellectual virtues like curiosity, openmindedness and reflectiveness. The point is that what liberals call 'autonomy' should be characterised by the way that one thinks.
Sketching autonomy as demanding a kind of thinking is a very well-established idea. For instance, in his work on autonomy, Stanley Benn (whom Levinson draws on extensively), holds that heteronomy involves adopting the norms and values of one's society unthinkingly and uncritically. Benn holds that, in contrast, autonomy amounts to living by norms that are one's own because one has assessed the choices open to one and has weighed up their merits. 46 In a phrase, autonomy involves thinking about one's choices for oneself. Going further than Benn, George Sher stresses that, in judging whether a person is autonomous, we must judge not only whether their thinking is 'their own', but must also take a view on whether their thinking is rational. Sher writes:
. . .autonomous agents are self-directing in the. . . sense of exercising their will on the basis of good reasons. 47 The point is that in ordinary English as well as in theory, 'autonomy' is a virtue. Moreover, along with associated notions like 'open-mindedness' and 'independence' (in the sense of 'self-sufficiency') it is an intellectual virtue because it has to do with forming a conception of how to conduct oneself based on reasons that one assesses for oneself. Autonomously choosing a way of life requires that a person be able to and inclined to reason about the kind of life they wish to lead. If both Levinson and Clayton are committed to enhancing autonomy through education, they are thereby already 'intellectually perfectionist'.
Reasonableness, Justice and Intellectual Character
The need for the cultivation of intellectual virtue in the liberal framework also follows from what Rawls holds regarding the importance of reasonableness in a democracy. Rawls holds that, to be 'reasonable' one must possess 'a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good'. According to Rawls, this political reasonableness has two aspects:
The first basic aspect of the reasonable . . . is the willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do. The second basic aspect. . . is the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgement and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime. 48 Clayton concedes that these are virtues and Rawls, too calls them 'virtues of persons'. 49 It is true that Clayton calls reasonableness a 'moral virtue'. 50 However, recall that for Rawls the reason why we must be reasonable is that we are all subject to the burdens of judgement and that the problems of judgement are, to a large extent, epistemic problems: different people have different views on the good life, we do not know which view is best and it is hard to justify one way or another what the best view is. Furthermore, the solution that Rawls proposes is intellectual too inasmuch as reasonable political cooperation requires a kind of thinking: seeing the point of view of the other, negotiating with them about how to live and coming to a compromise that is acceptable to all.
In the literature from political philosophy and from ethics, Young and Sher call reasonableness a form of thinking. 51 In education, Michael Pritchard discusses the virtue of reasonableness at length. Pritchard outlines the features of reasonablenessseeking information, thoughtfulness, open-mindedness, giving reasons, acknowledging mistakes, and compromise -five out of these six are straightforwardly intellectual rather than moral. 52 And Curren draws a strong connection between Rawls's thinking about reasonableness as the virtue required by the burdens of judgement and the classical virtue of judgement par excellence -phronesis. For Currenthe kind of judgement that is required in order to weigh up the different goods that we can pursue in life (for us and for others) is Aristotle's intellectual virtue phronesis. 53 It seems that despite calling the virtues of reasonableness 'moral' Clayton is aware that what is needed to be reasonable is largely an intellectual matter. He writes:
. . . one's view is reasonable if one possesses the requisite powers of theoretical and practical reason and one's beliefs are the product of one's employment of these powers under conditions of freedom. These powers consist in the ability to weigh evidence appropriately, draw inferences, balance competing considerations, and so on. On the other hand, one's view is epistemically unreasonable if it is the product of practical or theoretical irrationalities, or bias due to the social and political conditions in which one deliberates. 54 In these passages, Clayton clearly recognises that being reasonable involves developing a virtuous manner and style of thinking; revealingly, he also holds that being reasonable involves avoiding intellectual vices (such as irrationality and bias). Clayton even holds that the need to inculcate this kind of rationality in children may sometimes over-ride our neutralism. In fact, the closest Clayton comes to endorsing non-neutrality is in a striking passage in which he considers whether teaching the truth about evolution does not perhaps amount to taking sides with secularism against religion. Clayton holds that, arguably, justice demands teaching evolution in this case. 55 I wholeheartedly agree and only wish to suggest that it is not justice that demands the teaching of evolution over creationism, but good old-fashioned rationality. I think it is not taking matters too far to hold that Rawlsian reasonableness is in fact an intellectual virtue and that commitment to Rawlsian reasonableness implies commitment to an intellectual perfectionist projectshaping children's reasonablenessin school.
The Scope of Liberal Intellectual Perfectionism
The point of arguments 6.1 and 6.2 above was that political liberalism demands intellectual perfectionism inasmuch as shaping children's (1) autonomy and (2) reasonableness is an exercise in perfectionist intellectual character education. However, even if our approach to education should be intellectually perfectionist, it is still an open question which intellectual virtues the education system should try to promote. There are a great many intellectual virtues discussed in the literature, for instance: responsibility, tenacity, open-mindedness, integrity, honesty, courage, confidence, humility, imaginativeness, curiosity, fairmindedness, autonomy, etc. Is it the task of the school to inculcate all of these intellectual virtues or just some? Conceivably, not all of these intellectual virtues, but only some may be needed for the political project of fostering the liberally important virtues of autonomy and reasonableness.
Which particular intellectual virtues need to be cultivated in the promotion of autonomy and reasonableness clearly needs working out. However, we have seen above that autonomy already demands a range of intellectual virtues, such as: openmindedness, reflectiveness, criticality and all-round rationality. Likewise, we saw that reasonableness demands a further range of virtues, such as open-mindedness (again), thoughtfulness, and (even) phronesis. The intellectual perfectionist project as it is advocated here is not committed to fostering the whole gamut of intellectual virtues that one could possibly develop through education. Instead, the aim is to show that at least some intellectual perfectionismat least as much intellectual perfectionism as is needed to foster autonomy and reasonablenessis politically justified.
However, it will be no great surprise if the list of intellectual virtues required to take part in liberal politics is extensive. Firstly, notice that, inasmuch as all political discussions (say, whether to vaccinate against a certain illness or not, whether to frack for natural gas, whether to devote a specified percentage of GDP to foreign aid, etc.) involve discussion of matters of fact, liberal politics requires most of the intellectual virtues that we need accurately to gather facts, debate solutions and implement policies. In as much as political discussion is simply a sharing of informationor even a form of collective decision-making as theorists of epistemic democracy contendthere seems little difference between the kind of virtues that one needs in having a political discussion in particular and simply deciding what to do in any practical area of one's life.
Another reason why the list of the intellectual virtues that the school should inculcate may be reasonably extensive is that the intellectual virtues show a degree of unity; that is the different intellectual virtues reinforce one another and are acquired as a package. The idea that the virtues form a unity and that one cannot truly have one virtue without having them all is a familiar idea from ethics. 56 However, one does not need to go that far to see some basic unifying elements in the intellectual virtues. Roberts and Wood, for instance, stress the important role of a 'love of knowledge' as a foundational intellectual virtue. 57 Baehr too, stresses the importance of a love of knowledge, but holds that a love of knowledge is not a distinct virtue, as such, but rather a motivational element of each and every virtue (such that one's inquisitiveness, accuracy and honesty are all driven by the same love of knowledge). 58 Be that as it may, it seems absolutely essential to being intellectually virtuous at all that one loves knowledge (and hates ignorance). Furthermore, it is quite clear to see that liberal politicsas a form of politics in which we engage in debates about how to live and try to convince others through reason to adopt the best way of living togethermust also be built on a love of knowledge and hatred of ignorance. Quite simply, people who do not love knowledge, seek it and spread it have no need for debate, political or otherwise; acceptance of ignorance closes down debate. If all intellectual virtue (and in particular the intellectual virtues we need to enable liberal politics) is motivated by a love of knowledge, we can structure our educational efforts to teach intellectual virtue around the central need to inculcate a love of knowledge amongst children. While there is clearly more to be said regarding the exact content of the intellectual perfectionist programme, the question which intellectual virtues in particular the school should focus on inculcating is not a debilitating one.
Intellectual Perfectionism is Not Strong Perfectionism
Having established that at least some intellectual perfectionism is justifiable on political grounds, though, it is natural to ask after the fate of the other comprehensive ideals, besides loving knowledge, that we could teach in school, like comprehensive ideals in morals, aesthetics, politics or religion. Does support for intellectual perfectionism in school entail support for perfectionism about morals, politics or religion too? No. Regarding these things, there is ample liberal argument that we should be cautious how much latitude we should allow to the school to shape children's views.
(1) Different people hold vastly different ideals regarding morals, politics and religion and it will be hard to get everyone to agree on one set of such ideals. 59 (2) Equality demands that the state respects everyone's moral view equally. 60 (3) It is not possible to justify comprehensive views regarding morals, politics and religion to everyone. 61 (4) Neutrality regarding morality is necessary to limit state power. 62 Caution about undue state interference in shaping children's moral, political or religious views is Clayton's core commitment and, while Levinson's view is a perfectionist one, she (and other weak perfectionists like Gutmann and Fowler) stresses that hers is a 'minimal' perfectionism and she remains, like Clayton a liberal opponent of enlisting children into comprehensive positions (save the liberal comprehensive position). As part of the 'intellectual perfectionist' programme, then, I propose to accept, like Clayton, that the school should not attempt to shape children's substantive view regarding morals, politics, religion, and so forth. This is a big concession to the neutralist position about education. In various ways, the liberal challenge in thinking about education concerns how to place a limit on what schools are allowed to teach in an effort to ensure that schools do not cross a line from merely educating children into indoctrinating them in comprehensive views that they did not choose for themselves. The intellectual perfectionist project is simply to suggest a new place to draw that line: schools are eminently justified in epistemic, 63 but also in political terms to improve children's intellects; however, as many liberals hold, it is problematic for schools to determine children's comprehensive moral, political and religious views. Intellectual perfectionism is simply another way to keep schools on the right side of the line between educating and indoctrinating; after all one cannot indoctrinate a child into thinking well, getting them to think well is simply education.
Admittedly, conflicts may arise between intellectually perfectionist schooling and complete neutralism about children's moral, religious and political commitments. Intellectual perfectionism, for instance, requires us to teach children deep knowledge of and respect for scientific evidence and, regarding, for instance, evolution, the scientific world view can conflict with the religious view. In cases like these, the intellectual perfectionist will have to bite the bullet. While it captures well the liberal idea that schools should enable children to think for themselves and thereby reflects much that liberals find important, intellectual perfectionism is still a form of perfectionism. If intellectual perfectionism ends up in disabusing children of ill-founded religious prejudices, so be it. Importantly, though, notice that when an intellectually perfectionist teacher teaches a child to respect and love science, she does not do so with the aim of changing a child's religious world view per se. The science lesson may have an influence on what the child ends up thinking about religion, but the broad-minded and sympathetic science teacher does not set out to disabuse the child of religious views as such. The good science teacher aims to convince the child, through rational demonstration, of a scientific fact. This may have a side consequence for the child's religious views, but not an effect by design. Intellectual perfectionism about schooling is the position that a teacher may consciously and by design attempt to change one thing about children and that is to improve their intellects. Admittedly, much will change about children as a result of their improved intellects. But the fact that something may change about the child's view as a consequence of their improving intellect (say, that a child gives up a strict literal interpretation of their religion or even gives up their religion altogether) is not to make that teaching too coercive for the liberal to accept. Instead, it is merely to acknowledge that newly autonomous people will employ that autonomy in different ways to think about their life.
Replies to Objections
One can imagine a number of possible objections to the idea that schools should be intellectually perfectionist.
One possible objection against intellectual perfectionism stems from the cautionary or sceptical thought that, not only in ethics and politics, but also in literature, history, economics, art or even natural science there are a great many disputed ideas. Take a contentious issue like whether we should teach children that the cause of World War I was Austro-Hungarian aggression or the legacy of British Imperialism. Advocates of both sides in this debate hold that their view is the correct one that should be taught to children. In the absence of consensus, how does one decide which of the rival theories to teach? Is it not politically more cautious to be neutral with regard to contentious questions like these and to eschew not only moral but also intellectual perfectionism? An intellectual perfectionism that focuses on the improvement of a style of thinking rather than on the inculcation of particular theories, canons or collection of facts already contains the answer to this worry. Recall that the proposal on the table is that schools should teach children the love of knowledge and the good habits of thinking that are essential in acquiring knowledge. The kind of intellectual perfectionism advocated here is not committed to the teaching of any particular piece of content that we could doubt, but only to the promotion of children's ability to engage in finding knowledge (for themselves and in collaboration with others), efficiently and well.
A second possible objection is that intellectual perfectionism would strip discussion of interesting and important matters to do with ethics, politics or spirituality out of school and would leave in its place only the undisputed facts. Moreover, because such a large part of the humanities, in particular, deals with ethics, politics and the meaning of life in the round, it may be feared that intellectual perfectionism will abandon the school curriculum entirely to the STEM subjects. This is not the intention. Intellectual perfectionism sees it as the task of the school to perfect children's intellects and their ability to think about the world and their place in it, rather than to direct them to taking up one of the many comprehensive perspectives that are possible about these matters. In our intellectual culture, there exist three well-developed forms of intellectual study of ethics, politics and spirituality, viz. the subject ethics, the subject political science and the subject theology. Study of all three of these is beneficial in developing someone's intellectual ability to engage with questions about the right, the just and the transcendent without necessarily forcing them to adopt a particular view. Our own subject, philosophy, attempts the same and the standard view about the teaching of philosophy is that the best kind of philosophical education is an education in thinking, rather than in any particular world view. An intellectual perfectionist education, therefore, is entirely compatible with teaching about ethics and politics, so long as this teaching is on the intellectual level and is aimed at fostering intellectual virtue rather than enlisting into a particular comprehensive view.
A third possible objection is that intellectual perfectionism assumes a very rigid distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues. Granted, it is sometimes difficult to make out whether a virtue is intellectual or moral; in fact, some virtues (for instance 'honesty') can be both intellectual and moral virtues at once. The thought is that if the distinction between intellectual and moral virtues does not hold up, it will be hard for schools to know what they are allowed to teach children and what not. At worst, the perfectionist licence provided by intellectual perfectionism may even cause a slide into moral perfectionism too. The worry is only serious if one cannot distinguish moral and intellectual virtues, but there are at least two good ways to draw this distinction. Firstly, one can draw the distinction based on the agent's motivation in demonstrating the virtue in question. In exhibiting a moral virtue (like, for instance, kindness) one is motivated by a distinctly moral concernthe wellbeing of another person. However, in exhibiting an intellectual virtue (like, for instance, rigour in inquiry) one is motivated not by the well-being of another, but by the love of knowledge. It is simple to see that these motivations may diverge. The classic case can be found in the realm of hurtful truths. My epistemic motivationto find out what is the fact of the matter no matter how anyone feels about itmay be different from my moral motivationto spare someone's feelings upon finding out something hurtful. A second way to draw the distinction is between the goods produced by intellectual and moral virtues. According to Driver, intellectual virtues produce fundamentally epistemic goods like truth, knowledge or understanding and the moral virtues produce moral goods, most prominently the wellbeing of others. 64 It is easy to see, again, that there are goods that are epistemically excellent, but morally questionable. Take, for instance, nuclear fission (not Driver's example). The mastery of the physics and technology needed to split the atom was awesome in scientific and technological termsit represents a signal epistemic good. However, whether the discovery of nuclear fission also represents a moral good is (at the very least) open to debate. In sum, it is entirely possible to distinguish between moral and intellectual virtue on the level of the motivation a person acts from or the good that results from the application of that virtue, and there is little reason to fear that the one must necessary slide into the other. If we can distinguish intellectual and moral virtues, there is also no reason to suppose that we cannot distinguish what it means to teach them.
Conclusion
In this article, I responded seriously to the worry that liberals have about character education in schools. I held that whether liberals should worry about character education depends not on whether anyone has consented to it or whether it was appropriately plural, but on what kind of character education is involved. I pressed Aristotle's original distinction between intellectual and moral virtue into service to show that what we would today call 'intellectual character education' is perfectly allowable by liberal standards. I held that even though they may not have put their finger on it, the idea that the school's role is intellectually, but not morally perfectionist was there all along in liberal thinking and that the best place to draw the distinction between what the liberal school should and should not be allowed to do in educating children is at the familiar line between shaping children's comprehensive conceptions about how to live and shaping their intellectual ability and inclination to think well about how they might want to live. 65 Ben Kotzee, School of Education, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK. h.b.kotzee@bham.ac.uk
